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Foreword 
 
Microfinance  phenomenon  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  socio-economic 
developments  of  our  times.  For  a  long  time  the  poor,  because  of  their  economic 
circumstance, were considered non-bankable. However, the “micro-credit phenomenon” 
has shown that the poor can be made creditworthy if they are organized in small groups. 
This  clearly  has  profound  implications  not  just  from  a  finance  perspective  but,  more 
importantly, from the perspective of poverty alleviation. 
 
Inspired by the Grameen experiment that started in Bangladesh around mid-70s, 
micro-credit has quickly spread in other parts of the developing world, including India. 
Micro-credit in India really started in a big way in the early 90s with the recognition of 
self-help groups as conduit for providing credit to the poor. In the late 90s, numerous 
agencies  involved  in  micro-credit  operations  in  India  started  adding  other  financial 
services, including micro-insurance to its micro-credit operations. Microfinance is surely 
coming of age in India. 
 
The importance of microfinance must be looked against the fact that even with wide 
network of banks in India, the low-income people especially in rural areas, have been 
largely  bypassed  by  the  formal  banking  system.  The  government  of  India  has  been 
involved in its promotion in a variety of ways. This movement needs further guidance and 
direction from government. 
 
This paper provides an overview of the micro-insurance scene in India and suggests 
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1  Introduction 
Micro-insurance, the term used to refer to insurance to the low-income people, is 
different  from  insurance  in  general  as  it  is  a  low  value  product  (involving  modest 
premium and benefit package) which requires different design and distribution strategies 
such as premium based on community risk rating (as opposed to individual risk rating), 
active involvement of an intermediate agency representing the target community and so 
forth. Insurance is fast emerging as an important strategy even for the low-income people 
engaged  in  wide  variety  of  income  generation  activities,  and  who  remain  exposed  to 
variety of risks mainly because of absence of cost-effective risk hedging instruments. 
 
Although the type of risks faced by the poor such as that of death, illness, injury 
and accident, are no different from those faced by others, they are more vulnerable to such 
risks because of their economic circumstance. In the context of health contingency, for 
example,  a  World  Bank  study  (Peters  et  al.  2002),  reports  that  about  one-fourth  of 
hospitalized Indians fall below the poverty line as a result of their stay in hospitals. The 
same study reports that more than 40 percent of hospitalized patients take loans or sell 
assets to pay for hospitalization.
1 Indeed, enhancing the ability of the poor to deal with 
various risks is increasingly being considered integral to any poverty reduction strategy 
(Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000, Siegel et al. 2001). 
 
Of the different risk management strategies
2, insurance that spreads the loss of the 
(few)  affected members among all the members who join insurance scheme and also 
separates time of payment of premium from time of claims, is particularly beneficial to 
                                                 
1   Such high percentage is also noted by some MFIs in the utilization pattern of loans advanced by them 
(see SHEPERD 2003 for example). 
2   Depending on an individual response to dealing with risks, the literature classifies all risk management 
practices  into  three  broad  groups:  risk  reduction  (RR),  risk  mitigation  (RM)  and  risk  coping  (RC) 
strategies. The first two are ex ante risk management strategies (that is, used before a risky event takes 
place) whereas the third is an ex post strategy (that is after the event takes place). Insurance, similar to 
savings and borrowings, is a part of risk mitigation strategy (Brown and Churchill 1999, Holzmann and 
Joergensen 2000).   2 




In the past insurance as a prepaid risk managing instrument was never considered 
as  an  option  for  the  poor.  The  poor  were  considered  too  poor  to  be  able  to  afford 
insurance premiums. Often they were considered uninsurable, given the wide variety of 
risks they face. However, recent developments in India, as elsewhere, have shown that not 
only can the poor make small periodic contributions that can go towards insuring them 
against risks but also that the risks they face (such as those of illness, accident and injury, 
life, loss of property etc.) are eminently insurable as these risks are mostly independent or 
idiosyncratic.
4 Moreover, there are cost-effective ways of extending insurance to them. 
Thus, insurance is fast emerging as a prepaid financing option for the risks facing the 
poor. 
 
In this paper, we analyse the early evidence on micro-insurance already available 
in this regard, highlight the current initiatives being contemplated to strengthen micro-
insurance  activity  in  the  country,  and  suggest  specific  ways  that  can  help  promote 
insurance  to  the  target  segment.  The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  section  2  we 
analyse the factors leading to the development of micro-insurance in India. In section 3 
we analyse the developments on the supply and demand sides of micro insurance. In 
section  4,  we  highlight  selected  issues  in  extending  insurance  to  low-income  people; 
focussing on two specific issues, namely the effect of flexibility of insurance premium 
and of combining micro-insurance with micro-finance. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3   According to Zeller and Sharma (1998), in spite of vibrant informal markets that can be observed in 
many  [developing  countries],  financial  services  for  the  poor  remain  inadequate.  For  credit  market 
imperfections see Besley 1995. 
4   Insurability of risks depends on the characteristics of risk (see Jütting 2002, Brown and Churchill 1999, 
Siegel and Alwang 1999).   3 
2  Development of Micro-insurance in India 
Historically in India, a few micro-insurance schemes were initiated, either by non-
governmental organizations (NGO) due to the felt need in the communities in which these 
organizations were involved or by the trust hospitals. These schemes have now gathered 
momentum partly due to the development of micro-finance activity, and partly due to the 
regulation that makes it mandatory for all formal insurance companies to extend their 
activities  to  rural  and  well-identified  social  sector  in  the  country  (IRDA  2000). As a 
result, increasingly, micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and NGOs are negotiating with the 
for-profit  insurers  for  the  purchase  of  customized  group  or  standardized  individual 
insurance schemes for the low-income people. Although the reach of such schemes is still 
very limited---anywhere between 5 and 10 million individuals---their potential is viewed 
to be considerable. The overall market is estimated to reach Rs. 250 billion by 2008 (ILO 
2004). 
 
The insurance regulatory and development authority (IRDA) defines rural sector 
as consisting of (i) a population of less than five thousand, (ii) a density of population of 
less than four hundred per square kilometer, and (iii) more than twenty five per cent of the 
male working population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. The categories of workers 
falling under agricultural pursuits are: cultivators, agricultural labourers, and workers in 
livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting and plantations, orchards and allied activities. 
   4 
The social sector as defined by the insurance regulator consists of (i) unorganized 
sector  (ii)  informal  sector  (iii)  economically  vulnerable  or  backward  classes,  and  (iv) 
other categories of persons, both in rural and urban areas.
5  
 
The social obligations are in terms of number of individuals to be covered 
by both life and non-life insurers in certain identified sections of the society.
6 The 
rural obligations are in terms of certain minimum percentage of total polices written by 
life insurance companies and, for general insurance companies, these obligations are in 
terms of percentage of total gross premium collected. Some aspects of these obligations 
are  particularly  noteworthy.  First,  the  social  and  rural  obligations  do  not  necessarily 
require (cross) subsidizing insurance. Second, these obligations are to be fulfilled right 
from the first year of commencement of operations by the new insurers. Third, there is no 
exit option available to insurers who are not keen on servicing the rural and low-income 
segment.  Finally,  non-fulfillment  of  these  obligations  can  invite  penalties  from  the 
regulator. 
 
In  order  to  fulfill  these  requirements  all  insurance  companies  have  designed 
products for the poorer sections and low-income individuals. Both public and private 
                                                 
5   (i) unorganized sector includes self-employed workers such as agricultural labourers, beedi workers 
(beedi  an  unfiltered  cigarette  made  by  rolling  tobacco  in  a  dry  leaf  of  a  particular  plant;  it  is  an 
inexpensive  substitute  for  cigarette  used  mostly  by  the  poor  smokers),  brick  workers,  carpenters, 
cobblers, construction workers, handicraft artisans, handloom workers, lady tailors, leather and tannery 
workers, street vendors, primary milk producers, rickshaw pullers, salt growers, sericulture workers, 
sugarcane cutters, washerwomen, working women in hills, or such other categories; (ii) informal sector 
includes small scale, self-employed workers typically at a low level of organization and technology, with 
primary objective of generating employment and income, with heterogeneous activities, with the work 
mostly  labour  intensive,  having  often  unwritten  and  informal  employer-employee  relationship;  (iii) 
economically  vulnerable  or  backward  classes  persons  who  live  below  poverty  line;  and  (iv)  other 
categories of persons include persons with disabilities and who may not be gainfully employed, as well 
as persons who tend to the disabled. 
6   Social sector obligation is applied to all insurers and it includes covering five thousand lives in the first 
financial year, seven thousand five hundred lives in the second, ten thousand lives in the third, fifteen 
thousand lives in the fourth, and twenty thousand lives in the fifth year. In case of a general insurer, the 
obligations specified include insurance for crops also. Rural sector obligation for a life insurers is set in 
terms of percentage of total policies written: seven percent in the first financial year, nine per cent in the 
second, twelve per cent in the third, fourteen per cent in the fourth, and sixteen per cent in the fifth year. 
Such obligations for general insurers are in terms of total gross premium income written in a year. It is 
two per cent in the first financial year, three percent in the second, and five per cent thereafter.   5 
insurance companies are adopting similar strategies of developing collaborations with the 
various  civil  society  associations.  The  presence  of  these  associations  as  a  mediating 
agency, or what we call a nodal agency, that represents, and acts on behalf of the target 
community is essential in extending insurance cover to the poor. The nodal agency helps 
the  formal  insurance  providers  overcome  both  informational  disadvantage  and  high 
transaction  costs  in  providing  insurance  to  the  low-income  people.  This  way  micro-
insurance  combines  positive  features  of  formal  insurance  (pre  paid,  scientifically 
organized scheme) as well as those of informal insurance (by using local information and 
resources that helps in designing appropriate schemes delivered in a cost effective way).
7 
 
In the absence of a nodal agency, the low resource base of the poor, coupled with 
high  transaction  costs  (relative  to  the  magnitude  of  transactions)  gives  rise  to  the 
affordability issue. Lack of affordability prevents their latent demand from expressing 
itself in the market. Hence the nodal agencies that organise the poor, impart training, and 
work for the welfare of the low-income people play an important role both in generating 
both the demand for insurance as well as the supply of cost-effective insurance. 
 
3  Supply and Demand Side Developments 
3.1  Supply of micro-insurance  
Recently, the ILO (2004a) prepared a list of products of all insurance companies, 
public as well as private, for the disadvantaged groups in India. Some of the observations 
made on the basis of the list are presented below: 
 
•  Out of 80 listed insurance products, 45 (55%) cover only a single risk. The other 
products, covering a package of risks, mostly focus on 2 (20%) or 3 (18%) risks. 
•  The available products cover a wide range of risks. However, the broad majority 
of the insurance products cover life (40 products or 52%) or accident-related risks. 
The health coverage remains very limited (12 products). 
                                                 
7   For more on the role of nodal agency in extending micro-insurance see Ahuja 2004.   6 
•  Most life insurance products (23 out of 42) are addressed to individuals. However, 
some products may be bought both by individuals and groups. 
•  Most  life  insurance  products  (55%)  have  been  designed  to  cover  anextended 
contract duration ranging from 3 to 20 years. 
•  Out of 42 life insurance products, 23 are pure risk products. The other 19 products 
propose various types of maturity benefits. 
•  Out of the 12 currently available health insurance products, 7 have been designed 
and are restricted to groups. 
•  Out  of  the  total  12  health  products,  7  products  propose  the  reimbursement  of 
hospitalization  expenses  while  the  other  5  have  chosen  to  narrow  down  the 
coverage to some specific critical illnesses. 
•  Most of the health insurance products specifically exclude deliveries and other 
pregnancy-related illnesses. Most of these products also mention amongst their 
exclusion clauses, HIV/AIDS. 
•  Most products whether life or non-life require a single payment of premium ( i.e., 
a one-time payment) upon subscription. 
•  Private  insurance  companies  have  three  times  more  products  than  the  public 
companies. 
 
As  per  the  IRDA  statistics,  the  public  insurance  companies  still  play  a 
predominant role in the present coverage of the rural and social sectors. This is only to be 
expected since the incumbent public insurers have been in the market for a number of 
years now. 
 
3.2  Demand for micro-insurance 
On the demand side too, the ILO (2004b) has recently prepared an inventory of 
micro-insurance schemes operational in India. Based on this list some of the observations 
are made below: 
   7 
•  The inventory lists 51 schemes that are operational in India.  
•  Most schemes are still very young, having started their operations during the last 
few years. Of the 39 schemes for which this information is available, around 24 
schemes came up during the last 4 years, and about 7 schemes have operated for 
more than a decade.  
•  As regards the beneficiaries, the 43 schemes for which the information is available 
cover 5.2 million people.  
•  Most insurance schemes (66%) are linked with micro finance services provided by 
specialized  institutions  (17  schemes)  or  non-specialized  organizations  (17 
schemes). Twenty two percent of the schemes are implemented by community 
based organizations, and 12% by health care providers.  
•  Life and health are the two most popular risks for which insurance is demanded: 
59%  of  schemes  provide  life  insurance  and  57%  of  them  provide  health 
insurance.
8  In  SEWA’s
9  experience  health  insurance  tops  the  list  of  risks  for 
which the poor need insurance. 
•  Twenty-five  out  of  37  schemes  received  some  external  funds  to  initiate  their 
schemes. Twenty out of 32 schemes received external technical assistance in the 
form of advisory services, technical services, training or even referral services for 
their schemes. 
•  In the majority of the schemes special staff had been recruited to manage the 
insurance activities. The other schemes kept relying on their regular staff while 
recognizing them the additional responsibilities linked to the management of the 
scheme.  
•  Most schemes (74%) operate in 4 southern states of India: Andhra Pradesh (27%), 
Tamil Nadu (23%), Karnataka (17%) and Kerala (8%), and the two western states 
(Maharashtra (12%) and Gujarat (6%)) account for 18% of the schemes.  
•  56% of schemes deal with one single risk. 
                                                 
8   Many MFIs and NGOs are in the process of introducing health insurance. 
9   SEWA is a labour union of informal economy women workers based in Ahmedabad city of Gujarat. Its 
operations now run in other states such as Madhya Pradesh, Delhi.   8 
•  Most schemes require single yearly premium at the time of subscription. Of the 43 
schemes, 6 use a monthly payment for their contribution, while 2 others have 
linked the contributions to some other activities developed with their members 
(disbursement of loan etc.).  
•  Most  of  the  schemes  (27)  rely  on  voluntary  contribution,  while  10  schemes 
imposed  compulsory  contributions,  and  7  adopted  a  mix  of  voluntary  and 
compulsory contributions (based on the type of service provided). 
 
Any nodal agency keen on buying insurance for their members now have a choice 
of  insurers  and  approach  those  who  offer  them  the  best  deal.  According  to  the  ILO 
inventory,  8  schemes have already entered into partnerships with at least 2 insurance 
companies  (public  or  commercial),  and  3  schemes  have  already  entered  simultaneous 
partnerships with both public and commercial insurance companies.
10 
 
Clearly,  health  and  life  are  two  most  important  risks  for  which  insurance  is 
demanded. Indeed, at low-income level, when much of the income goes into meeting 
basic needs, the scope of having varying priority needs is very limited. On the supply side 
we observe that out of 80 odd products only 7 products are health insurance products that 
provide for reimbursement of hospital expenses. Admittedly, compared to life insurance, 
which is a relatively straightforward business, health insurance is a much more complex 
service as it involves addressing the provision of healthcare that is location specific. The 
design and sale of products are currently driven by the objective of meeting the regulatory 
obligation and the making of profits or reducing losses. In this situation, there is a danger 
of certain priority needs getting neglected by the insurance companies. 
 
Most products require single yearly premium at the time of subscription. It is well 
known that rural incomes are irregular and uncertain to enable payment of premium in 
one go, and more so when only a part of the remuneration is paid in cash. In the above, 
                                                 
10  Twenty (20) schemes have already developed partnerships with public insurance companies and 14 
schemes have already developed partnerships with commercial insurance companies.   9 
we find only a few schemes offer flexibility in paying premium. This could act as a 
serious drawback in increasing the membership. 
 
We find that most of the schemes are concentrated in the southern region of the 
country. The southern regions are well known for the social mobilization of low-income 
people.  In  contrast,  the  northern  region  is  bereft  of  such  mobilization  as  the  nodal 
agencies are either non-existent or dysfunctional. Creating and nurturing nodal agencies 
can be quite involved and can take a long time to develop. Local government, that can 
also perform the role of nodal agency, will take a long time to strengthen as a result of 
decentralization  process  currently  underway  in  most  Indian  states.  There  has  to  be 
alternative approaches to extending insurance in regions where nodal agencies do not 
exist. 
 
Even  before  insurance  is  bought  for  all  important  contingencies,  affordability 
constraint is likely to kick in, especially for the low-income people. The issue then is how 
to cover for these other important contingencies. One of the ways suggested is to impose 
a tax at industry level (this could be on the turnover or profits of the industry), and use the 
tax proceeds for the benefit of workforce involved in activities peripheral to the industry. 
 
Finally, the type of contingency and the number of people covered under it are 
important parameters, but so is the extent of benefit provided should the contingency 
happen. Currently, the benefit or protection provided under some insurance schemes is 
quite shallow. 
 
The attitude of insurers on these obligations has been mixed. Some have taken a 
positive  view  of  the  regulatory  obligations  and  have  made  a  genuine  attempt  to 
understand the rural and low-income segment of the market. Indeed, a few insurers have 
actually surpassed their obligations by a wide margin. These companies have realised that 
there is potential in the rural and low-income segment but tapping that potential requires a 
different  kind  of  approach.  In  some  cases,  insurance  companies  have  actually  cross-  10 
subsidised their micro-insurance products while in other cases insurers have been able to 
find a donor for paying premium, at least in part, on behalf of the low-income people. 
 
The impact of rural and social obligations on extending insurance to the intended 
people  has  been  positive.  However,  development  of  micro-insurance  needs  further 
guidance from the insurance regulator by way of supplementary provisions. Sensing this, 
the insurance regulator has already come out with a concept paper on micro-insurance
11 in 
which it has spelled out its thinking on what these supplementary provisions could be. 
 
4  On Extending Micro-insurance 
Prior  to  the  introduction  of social and rural obligations, insurance to the low-
income  people  took  the  form  of  (i)  a  nodal  agency  tying  up  with  one  of  the  public 
insurance companies (the intermediate model), and (ii) a nodal agency itself underwriting 
risk i.e., performing the role of an insurance company (the insurer model). However, with 
the social and rural obligations the insurer model is becoming less common and is getting 
subsumed in the intermediate model. To further promote this model, the IRDA is thinking 
of introducing supplementary provisions outlined in its concept note on micro-insurance 
in  which  it  defines  ‘micro-insurance’  and  ‘micro-insurance  agent’.  The  concept  note 
suggests how a single insurance company can offer composite insurance product to the 
low-income people, sets a ceiling on the commission that can be paid to insurance agents, 
minimum coverage to make insurance meaningful, and so forth.
 12 
 
At a time when the supplementary provisions on micro-insurance are still under 
consideration  by  IRDA,  two  aspects  that  need  to  be  considered  are:  (i)  the  role  of 
flexibility in premium collection, and (ii) micro-insurance taken up by MFIs as distinct 
from non-MFIs. We elaborate each of these two points below. 
 
                                                 
11   The concept paper on micro-insurance can be downloaded from : www.irdaindia.org 
12   Discussions on the several provisions under the concept note are already underway and the regulator has 
an open mind on the subject. A noteworthy point is that the concept paper is very much in line with 
promoting insurer-agent model.   11 
4.1  Flexibility in Premium 
In  the  IRDA’s  concept  note  on  micro-insurance  there  is  no  provision  that 
explicitly  calls  for  allowing  flexibility  in  premium  collection  which  is  necessary  for 
extending the reach of micro-insurance. Although some micro-insurance products allow 
for half-yearly, quarterly and even monthly payment of premium, most products whether 
life or non-life require single, yearly payment of premium upon subscription. This can be 
a  serious  drawback  in  extending  the  reach  of  insurance  to  the  low-income  people, 
especially  in  rural  areas.  Often  nodal  agencies  adopt  several  methods  to  facilitate 
premium collection. These methods may take the form of soft loans for paying premium, 
collecting  premium  in  kind,  collecting  smaller  amounts  but  more  frequently,  having 
insurance contract of shorter durations and so forth. Where a nodal agency collects annual 
premium in one go, there is not much involvement of the agency. 
 
Rural incomes display seasonality. Moreover, for the low income people premium 
constitutes  a  significant  proportion  of  their  income.  Therefore,  flexibility  in  premium 
collection has a bearing on their joining or not joining an insurance scheme, and hence, 
on  the  membership  size.  The  literature  on  micro-insurance  cites  the  importance  of 
appropriate ‘timings’ for premium collection. In particular, premium collection schedule 
should  match  with  the  cash  flows.  The  cash  flow  varies  for  different  categories  of 
workers. For example, the cash flows in case of farmers would depend on the number of 
crop  cycles  in  a  year  as  well  as  on  the  timings  of  harvest  whereas  a  self-employed 
household  worker  may  have  a  more  stable  income  stream.  Therefore,  synchronizing 
premium  collection  with  the  harvest  time  is  necessary  for  farmers  whereas  for  self-
employed household workers paying premium in small but regular installments may be 
easier. Also, cash flows for the rural poor may be different from those of the urban poor.
13 
 
The ‘type’ of flexibility needed in premium collection would depend very much 
on (i) the pattern of income stream of the target population, and (ii) the spread of risk for 
                                                 
13  Rural poor get lump sums in the agricultural seasons whereas urban poor get small amounts frequently 
(Sinha 2002).   12 
which insurance is sought. As noted above the former is necessary for increasing the 
membership. The latter is needed to induce insurance company to allow for flexibility in 
premium collection. To elaborate on this, supposing for a one year insurance contract, 
premium is collected twice a year in equal installments. If the risks for which insurance is 
bought are unevenly distributed between the two sub-periods that make up a year then the 
interest  of  insurance  company  needs  to  be protected against the possibility of greater 
outflow (on account of higher claims) than the premium inflow in the first sub-period. 
The  protection  could  come  when  either  the  nodal  agency  provides  for  some  implicit 
guarantees or when the insurance contract is initiated in a sub period having lower risk or 
when flexibility in premium collection is built taking this fact into account. 
 
Thus, flexibility in premium collection needs to be appropriate from the viewpoint 
of both the insurer and the insured.
14 An explicit provision in this respect in the concept 
note would be a significant step forward. 
 
Formally, we demonstrated this below: 
 
Supposing in a single period case, a risk averse, utility maximizing agent faces 
two states of nature: a good state, whose probability is denoted by (1-p), yields income y, 
and a bad (loss) state, with probability p, yields income denoted by y-L. Faced with these 
uncertain income prospects, the agent’s expected utility is given as:  
 
(1-p) u(y) + p u(y-L) 
 
To convert this uncertain prospect into a certain prospect, supposing the agent has 
the option of buying insurance at an actuarially fair price.
15 Faced with this option, the 
                                                 
14  According to Tenkorang (2001), several studies on Africa show that demand for health care services is 
often hindered by immediate cash payments involved. 
15  Actuarially fair price is the price at which insurance company selling insurance makes zero-expected 
profits. This condition characterises competitive insurance market. In the absence of zero transaction 
costs, the actuarially fair price is the same as probability of bad state showing up.    13 
standard result in insurance theory suggests that the agent would buy full insurance (see 
Mas-Colell et al. 1995, pp. 187-188). The utility the agent would get after buying full 
insurance is given as: u(y-pL), where pL denotes actuarially fair premium paid by the 
agent. This stylized result holds when the agent in question has sufficient income to buy 
insurance. In case of the poor, who often live on day-to-day basis, the analysis needs to be 
modified. While the poor may be able to afford premium on the basis of his average 
annual income, he may not be able to pay premium in a single installment. 
 
That is, while y-p L > c, (the aggregate income less the premium is greater than 
the basic consumption denoted by c), he may not be able to pay premium in one go, if this 
aggregate income y is earned in different periods, whereas the insurance contract is for the 
entire period. In particular, if the agent earns his income y, in two equal installments, and 
his consumption is also split evenly over this two periods, then assuming that risk is also 
spread evenly, the more appropriate representation of his expected utility is not (1-p) u(y) 
+ p u(y-L) as assume above, but rather  
 
2 {(1-p/2) u(y/2) + p/2 u(y/2-L)}, that is, two times the utility the agent gets in a 
sub-period (the expression in the curly braces represents utility in a sub-period). 
 
Notice that we cannot split the loss in the two sub-periods in the same way as we 
do for income and consumption because of the lumpiness of it (the bad state is defined as 
the state in which agent’s experiences loss, L). 
 
We continue to assume that the agent earns this total income in two sub-periods, 
while the insurance contract is for the entire two periods. It is easy to check that the best 
strategy would be to collect premium in two installments. In the absence of savings the 
agent may not be able to pay premium if it is collected in one installment. That is, if y/2-
pL< c/2, the agent would not be able to pay premium and hence not buy insurance. 
   14 
However, if the agent is charged premium in two equal installments he may be 
able to buy insurance. We demonstrate this below. Expected utility of agent when he is 
fully insured and the premium is spread over two sub periods is:  
 




That the agent is better off with insurance than without it (that is, u((y-pL)/2) > 
{(1-p/2)  u(y/2)  +  p/2  u(y/2-L)}),  follows  straightaway  from  the  fact  that  insurance at 
actuarially fair price makes risk averse agent better off. This suggests that periodicity in 
premium collection should match the income schedule of the target community under 
consideration. In the above we assumed symmetry with respect to risk as well as income. 
We allow for asymmetries in risk and income below. In particular we consider two cases: 
case (i) when risk is asymmetric, and case (ii) when income is asymmetric. 
 
Case (i): When risk is asymmetric  
Supposing now that the risk over these two sub-periods is not spread evenly. Let’s 
assume that the risk is higher (2p/3) in the first sub-period than in the second sub-period 
(p/3).  In the absence of insurance, agent’s expected utility would be given as: 
 
{(1-2p/3) u(y/2) + (2p/3) u(y/2-L)} + {(1-p/3) u(y/2) + (p/3) u(y/2-L)} 
 
The two expressions in the curly braces represent agent’s utility in each of the 
sub-periods. 
 
In this case too if insurance premium is spread out evenly, agent’s expected utility 
continues to be the same as in the previous case (2 u(y-pL)/2)). However, if the premium 
is spread out evenly, the insurer may actually stand to lose if the agent, having lived the 
first  (more  risky)  sub-period,  fails  to  pay  second  installment.  In  this  situation,  from   15 
insurer’s viewpoint the premium collection in the first sub-period (pL/2) will fall short of 
the  claims  (2pL/3).  For  this  reason,  the  insurer  is  likely  to  oppose  the  collection  of 
premium in two equal installments in each of the sub-periods. Alternatively, insurer may 
prefer to initiate insurance contract during the sub-period when the agent has lower risk 
(because  the  premium  collection  (pL/2)  would  exceed  claims  (pL/3),  and  therefore 
insurance company faces no risk of losing out in case agent fails to repay during the 
second sub-period). 
 
Case (ii): When income is asymmetric  
Consider another situation where the asymmetry between the two sub-periods is 
not in terms of risk but in terms of income. Supposing that now the agent earns 2/3 rd of 
his income in the first sub-period and the remaining in the second sub-period. In the 
absence of insurance his utility is:  
 
{(1-p/2) u(2y/3) + (p/2) u(2y/3-L)} + {(1-p/2) u(y/3) + (p/2) u(y/3-L)} 
 
His utility in case of insurance when the premium is distributed evenly is; 
 
u(2y/3-pL/2) + u(y/3-pL/2)}. 
 
From the agent’s perspective it is better to pay higher premium when his income 
is higher. (The agent is unlikely to pay half the premium amount in the second sub-period 
when his income is lower.) From an insurer’s perspective, it is better to collect premium 
in  equal  installments  since  risks  are  distributed  evenly.  Collecting  premium  in  two 
unequal installments (lower installment when the agent’s income is lower) gives rise to 
the same problem as discussed above: that the agent may not pay the second installment. 
A way to get around this problem is to collect premium in two unequal installments but 
beginning from higher installment in the period in which agent has higher income. 
   16 
The  above  analysis  highlights  the  need  for  having  flexibility  in  premium 
collection and, moreover, the type of flexibility depends very much on the risks and the 
income  of  the  target  community.  Thus,  appropriately  flexible  mechanism  from  the 




4.2  Micro-insurance and micro-finance 
Micro-finance activity in the country is leading to the spread of micro-insurance 
among its members/clients. For MFIs, integrating insurance with their credit and savings 
activities  makes  logical  sense  as  it  helps  them  to  reap  scale  economies  in  financial 
management, provides them with a captive market, and enables them to use their existing 
network and distribution channels to sell insurance. Besides, linking micro-insurance with 
micro-credit makes it cheaper for the borrower to have both these financial services. 
 
Indeed, the natural linkage between micro-insurance and micro-finance is well 
reflected in the ILO inventory referred to earlier. Not only are the specialized micro-
finance organizations the most numerous in initiating the micro-insurance schemes, but 
many organizations involved in other activities are also providing micro-finance services 
to their target groups. Since most of the larger micro-finance organizations operate in the 
three southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the existence of 
micro-insurance  schemes  in  the  south  appears  directly  proportional  to  the  growth  of 
micro-finance activities in that part of the country. 
 
Insurance helps in reducing interest rate charged on credit. With insurance interest 
rate together with the premium may be lower than interest rate charged in the absence of 
insurance. The intuition runs as follows: contingencies such as illness, accident, life etc. 
have a bearing on project performance and thereby on loan recovery. Health insurance, 
for example, by improving financial access to medical care of the insured who takes 
                                                 
16  According to Tenkorang (2001), several studies on Africa show that demand for health care services is 
often hindered by immediate cash payments involved.   17 
loan/credit,  reduces  disruption  in  the  economic  activity  for  which  loan  is  taken,  and 
thereby  enables  the  borrower  to  repay  loan.  Higher  loan  recovery  is  an  important 
determinant of interest rate charged by a lending agency. The higher the loan recovery, 
the lower is the interest rate charged by a lender. Thus, insurance, by reducing the risk of 
loan default due to the contingency against which insurance is bought, reduces interest 
rate  charged  by  the  lender.  For  this  reason  it  makes  better  sense  for  micro  credit 
organizations  to  introduce  micro-insurance.  Important  here  is  to  stress  that  when 
insurance is integrated with credit the total amount charged (i.e., interest plus premium) 
may be lower than the interest charged in the absence of insurance. 
 
Below  we  formally  demonstrate  why  integrating  micro-insurance  with  micro 
finance makes better sense. 
 
Let  us  first  look  at  the  issue  from  a  borrower’s  perspective.  Supposing  u  (y) 
denotes  the  utility  that  a  risk  averse  agent  (characterised  by  standard  concavity 
assumptions made on the utility function) gets from his income, y. Supposing in a two-
period setting, the agent’s income in the first period is y, and he runs the risk of not being 
able to earn this usual income in the second period if he, for example, falls sick. In the 
event of sickness, whose probability for the sake of simplicity is 0.5, his income reduces 




Note  that,  we  have  assumed  the  discount  rate  to  be  1  (this  is  a  simplifying 
assumption). If the agent has access to insurance he would be better off with insurance 
than without it as his utility with insurance would be strictly greater than without it i.e., 
[u(y-z/2)+ u(y)] > u(y)+(1/2)[u(y)+u(y-z)]. But our starting point is the case when the 
agent (or the borrower) does not have access to insurance.
17 
                                                 
17   Another way of looking at the absence of insurance is to consider the agent to be at his subsistence level 
and therefore cannot afford insurance premium even when he has access to it.   18 
 
Against this backdrop, let’s examine the case in which the agent takes credit for 
some productive activity in period 1. Let L denote the loan amount, R denote the return 
the borrower generates on the investment made from the loan amount, and r denote the 
rate of interest the borrower has to pay to the lender. We assume that the activity for 
which loan is taken is per se risk free i.e., there is no inherent risk in the project for which 
the loan is taken. This is a simplifying assumption motivated by the fact that the risk of 
the  failure  of  micro  enterprises  (distinct  from  that  of  loan  default)  is  negligible.  We 
further assume that the loan default occurs if the individual falls sick, in which case he 
neither  repays  the  loan  amount  nor  gains  from  the  borrowed  loan.  Under  these 




We  have  assumed  that  the  loan  taken  in  the  first  period  cannot  be  used  as 
consumption loan. It has to be strictly invested in an income generating activity (hence L 
does not figure in the first period utility). The borrower reaps the benefit from the activity 
only in the second period if he stays healthy. However, if he falls sick, the value of the 
income generating activity depreciates. For simplicity we assume that this value becomes 
nil (i.e., L=0) so that neither the lender nor the borrower is able to recover anything from 
the investment. 
  
Supposing that the agent has an option of buying insurance by paying actuarially 
fair premium in the first period. Since insurance is available at actuarially fair premium 
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From lender’s perspective there are two cases: 
 
Case I: when the agent (the borrower) doesn’t have insurance 
 
In this case, the lender would charge interest rate so that the amount he gets back 
is greater than (or equal to) the amount he has to pay i.e., the cost of credit to the lender 
denoted by s. This condition is shown below. 
 
r0 L/2 ≥ sL, where r0 is the interest rate charged by the lender 
 
=> r0 ≥ 2s.  ………………(1) 
 
In equilibrium, this inequality will hold as equality. 
 
Case II: when the agent (the borrower) has insurance 
 
In case the agent has insurance, the probability of loan default is zero in which 
case the lender is able to recover full amount he lends. So the rate of interest he charges is 
greater than the cost of funds to the lender i.e.,   
 
r1 L ≥ s L.  ………………..(2) 
where r1 is the interest rate charged by the lender 
 
In equilibrium this inequality will hold as equality. 
                                                 
18   Note that if we believed in the previous footnote then given higher income of agent in the second period, 
he will be able to afford insurance if consumption loan were available.   20 
 
From (1) and (2), it is straightforward to check that r0>r1.  
 
From the borrower’s perspective it would be better to have insurance when the 
interest rate plus the premium that he is lower than the interest rate charged in the absence 
of insurance. This would be the case if r0>r1+z/2. Substituting the equilibrium values of 
r0 and r1 yields the condition: 2s > s+z/2 or 2s>z. Thus from borrower’s perspective it 
may make good sense to buy insurance along with loan only when the above condition 
holds. 
 
The lender whose clients do not have access to insurance would end up charging 
higher rate of interest and this would tend to turn his borrowers away from him and 
towards  the  lender  who  also  provides  insurance.  So,  from  the  lender’s  perspective  it 
makes good sense to integrate insurance with their finance operations. 
 
Given the beneficial outcome of integrating micro-insurance with micro-finance, 
it is necessary to have a pro-active policy that would promote such integration. Currently, 
the MFIs are not even regulated and therefore the scope of public policy in promoting this 
integration or even promoting micro-insurance in general is very limited. Furthermore, 
besides  MFIs,  microcredit  is  also  being  extended  by  the  government  through  several 
programs. It becomes imperative for the government to have a clear thinking on how to 
promote micro-insurance on the one hand and microcredit with its positive impact on 
poverty reduction and empowerment on the other. At present, the concept note does not 
make  any  distinction  between  micro-insurance  through  micro-finance  institutions  and 
micro-insurance through other agencies. 
 
5  Conclusions  
Policy-induced and institutional innovations are promoting insurance among the 
low-income  people  who  form  a  sizable  sector  of  the  population  and  who  are  mostly 
without  any  social  security  cover.  Although  the  current  reach  of  ‘micro-insurance’  is   21 
limited, the early trend in this respect suggests that the insurance companies, both public 
and private, operating with commercial considerations, can insure a significant percentage 
of the poor. Serving low-income people who can pay the premium certainly makes a 
sound commercial sense to insurance providers. To that extent imposing social and rural 
obligations by insurance regulator (IRDA) is helping all insurance companies appreciate 
the vast untapped potential in serving the lower end of the market. 
 
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that micro-insurance needs a further 
push and guidance from the regulator as well as the government. IRDA has already come 
up with the concept note on micro-insurance, which suggests the regulator’s bias towards 
insurer-agent model. Even so, two areas in which having explicit provisions would aid the 
development  of  micro-insurance  are:  one,  flexibility  in  premium  collection,  and  two, 
encouraging micro-insurance among micro-finance institutions (MFIs). 
 
Given irregular and uncertain income stream of the poor, flexibility in premium 
collection is needed to extend the micro-insurance net far and wide. Moreover, MFIs are 
playing a significant role in improving the lives of poor households. Quite apart from this, 
linking micro-insurance with micro-finance makes better sense as it helps in bringing 
down the cost of lending. Given this, there is a case for strengthening the link between 
micro-insurance  and  micro-credit.  At  present  microfinance  business  in  the  country  is 
unregulated. Regulation of MFIs is needed not only to promote micro-finance activity in 
the country but also to promote the linking of micro-insurance with micro-finance which 
as demonstrated in the paper makes a good sense. 
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